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DAUBERT UPDATE: THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS
OF THE KUMHO TIRE DECISION*
KRISTEN M. HOEHN
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE FEDERAL RULES of Evidence were made effective July
1, 1975. Twenty-five years later we can conclusively make
the following assertions with respect to expert testimony:
* General acceptance' is not a necessary pre-condition to
admissibility.2
* Courts serve a gate keeping function of assessing reliability
and relevance.'
" All experts are subject to reliability and relevance
examination.4
However, practitioners continue to struggle with the application
of these principles.
II. THE TRINITY
Any examination of the law concerning admissibility must be-
gin with a discussion of three U.S. Supreme Court decisions:
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,5 General Electric Co. v.
Joiner,6 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.7
* This paper would not have been possible without the tireless assistance of
Laura MacGregor Comek, who, in January 2000, after recent admission to the
Ohio bar, became an attorney with Crabbe, Brown, & James.
See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
2 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1993).
3 See id. at 589.
4 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-50 (1999).
5 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
6 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
7 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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A. DAUBERT
Plaintiffs/Petitioners were minor children born with serious
birth defects. Their parents brought suit alleging the birth de-
fects had been caused by the mother's ingestion, during preg-
nancy, of Bendectin, a commonly described anti-nausea drug.8
Plaintiffs' experts testified that Bendectin could cause birth de-
fects. They based their conclusion on in-vitro studies, in-vivo
animal studies, pharmacological studies of Bendectin's chemical
structures, and reanalysis of epidemiological studies.
Defendants' expert testified that Bendectin did not cause
birth defects. He based his conclusion on a review of all litera-
ture-thirty published studies involving over 130,000 patients. No
study found Bendectin caused birth defects.
The court granted Defendants summary judgment. The dis-
trict court concluded, "causation may be shown only through
reliance upon epidemiological evidence."9
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court. 10 The appellate
court relied on Frye v. United States" and stated that, "[e]xpert
opinion based on a scientific technique 'is admissible if it is gen-
erally accepted as a reliable technique among the scientific com-
munity.'"12 The court explained, "the methodology cannot
diverge significantly from the procedures accepted by recog-
nized authorities in the field." 3 This decision conflicted with
the Third Circuit's in DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 4
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to establish the
proper standard for admission of expert testimony. 5 The Court
explained that a trial judge, when faced with a proffer of expert
testimony, must perform a preliminary Federal Rule of Evidence
104 analysis.' 6 This involves a two-pronged assessment of
8 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 727 F. Supp. 570, 571 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
9 Id. at 572.
10 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991).
11 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
12 Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1129 (quoting United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522,
1526 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Frye, 293 F. at 1014)).
13 Id. at 1130.
14 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990). In DeLuca, the Third Circuit examined the
same types of evidence (in-vitro studies, in-vivo animal studies, and reanalysis of
the epidemiological data) and concluded the district court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of Merrell Dow. The court found the record was
insufficient to support a wholesale exclusion of this type of evidence. Id. at 959.
15 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 506 U.S. 914 (1992).
16 See FED. R. EVID. 104. Rule 104 states:
(a) Questions of admissibility generally.
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whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testi-
mony is valid, as well as whether that reasoning or methodology
can be applied to the facts at issue.17 The Court continued,
"[m] any factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume
to set out a definitive checklist or test."18
Unfortunately, the court added "general observations" dis-
cussing the hallmarks of scientific validity.. The four areas men-
tioned by the court subsequently became known as the Daubert
factors. The Daubert factors used to determine scientific validity
are:
" Whether the theory or technique can be (and has been)
tested.
" Whether the theory or technique has been subject to peer
review and publication.
" The known or potential rate of error for the theory or
technique.
" General acceptance in the scientific community. 19
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person
to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility
of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the
provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is
not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to
privileges.
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact.
When the relevancy of evidence depends on the fulfillment of
a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to,
the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of
the fulfillment of the condition.
(c) Hearing of Jury.
Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all cases be
conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other
preliminary matters shall be so conducted when the interests of
justice require, or when an accused is a witness and so requests.
(d) Testimony by accused.
The accused does not, by testifying upon a preliminary matter,
become subject to cross-examination as to other issues in the
case.
(e) Weight and credibility.
This rule does not limit the right of a party to introduce before
the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility.
Id.
17 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579, 592-593.
18 Id. at 593.
19 See id. at 593-94.
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Practitioners have struggled with the application of these factors
since their publication.2 °
B. JOINER
Plaintiff/Respondent Joiner worked as an electrician for the
City of Thomasville, Georgia for approximately twenty years,
holding the title of chief electrician for the last eight years. 21 As
part of his job duties, he worked on transformers fifty percent of
the time. In the process of repairing the transformers, he was to
open the transformers, drain them of dielectric fluid, heat dry
the transformers, and refill them with fresh dielectric fluid. To
complete this task, Joiner submerged his hands and arms into
the dielectric fluid.
Although dielectric fluid should have been free of PCBs, ap-
proximately one-fifth of the transformers were contaminated.22
Joiner, at the age of thirty-seven, was diagnosed with small-cell
lung cancer. He brought suit against both the manufacturers of
the transformers and the manufacturer of the dielectric fluid.
He alleged his exposure to PCBs was at least partly responsible
for his development of cancer.
Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting in part,
that Joiner was unable to produce credible admissible scientific
evidence that exposure to PCBs, furons, and dioxins caused
small-cell lung cancer. Joiner presented testimony by two medi-
cal doctors who based their testimony, in part, on the assump-
tion that virtually all of the dielectric fluid Joiner contacted was
contaminated. 23 Additionally, Joiner's experts based their opin-
ions on animal studies2 4 and epidemiological studies. 25
20 In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist foretold of the problems that precipi-
tated Kumho as well as those we still face today. See id. at 598-601.
21 SeeJoiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1312 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
22 See id. at 1312-13. The transformers manufactured by GE and Westinghouse
were tested by the City beginning in 1983. The City tested 2,668 of its transform-
ers. Approximately half of them had PCBs; 2.5% contained levels of PCBs above
500 parts per million and 16.7% contained levels of PCBs above 50 parts per
million. The EPA considers transformers with PCBs below 50 parts per million
non-PCB transformers. Id.
23 Id. at 1321-22.
24 These studies involved direct injection of high doses of PCBs into the bodies
of infant mice. The mice developed adenomas, not small-cell carcinoma. See id.
at 1322-23.
25 The epidemiological studies involved assessment of increased incidence of
lung cancer deaths in various worker populations, but no study found the in-
crease in lung cancer statistically significant. See id. at 1324-25.
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The district court performed a Daubert analysis of reliability
and relevance. 26 The court focused on whether plaintiffs expert
testimony "fit" the facts at issue. The court found the evidence
thatJoiner was exposed to furons and dioxins insufficient.27 Be-
cause Plaintiff's experts assumed exposure to furons and diox-
ins, the court determined the expert testimony did not "fit" the
facts of the case.28
The court also examined the studies supporting plaintiff's ex-
pert testimony and determined that reliance on these studies
was misplaced because there were only two studies and those
studies involved massive doses of PCBs. 29 Regarding the epide-
miological studies, the court examined portions of each study
and concluded they did not support the experts conclusions.3 0
Thus, the court granted defendants' summary judgment.
The plaintiff appealed the decision to the Eleventh Circuit.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court and remanded
the case. 1 The court applied "a particularly stringent standard
of review to the trial judge's exclusion of expert testimony. "32
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the circuit
court.3 The Court held that abuse of discretion is the appropri-
ate standard of review.34
C. KUMHO TIRE
Plaintiff/Respondent Patrick Carmichael purchased a 1988
Ford Aerostar Minivan in July 1993. After driving approximately
seven thousand miles in the minivan, Carmichael was involved
in a single-vehicle accident in which the right rear tire failed,
allegedly causing the driver to lose control of the vehicle. 5
26 The district court did not apply the Daubert factors outlined above. See supra
text accompanying note 20. Rather, the court focused on a Rule 104 preliminary
assessment of whether the methodology was valid and whether the methodology
could be applied to the facts at issue. See id. at 1320.
27 See Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1319 (N.D. Ga, 1994).
28 Id. at 1322.
29 Id. at 1323.
30 Id. at 1324.
31 Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524, 534 (11th Cir. 1996).
32 Id. at 529. In support of this standard, the Circuit court cited Daubert and In
re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 750 (3d Cir. 1994). Id. Neither
case stands for the proposition that a higher standard of review applies to eviden-
tiary rulings involving expert testimony.
33 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
34 See id. at 139, 143.
35 See Carmichael v. Samyang Tires, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1514, 1517-19 (S.D. Ala.
1996). The tire had been on the vehicle for some unknown period of time prior
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Plaintiff instituted a products liability action alleging the pres-
ence of a design or manufacturing defect in the right rear tire.
Plaintiff employed one expert witness to testify about the
product defect.36 That expert was a mechanical engineer who
had ten years experience in the field of tire design. 7 The court
assumed, without deciding, the expert was qualified to offer ex-
pert testimony on the subject.3
Plaintiffs expert examined the tire for the first time on the
morning of his deposition. His examination was limited to a vis-
ual inspection. The district court evaluated the expert testi-
mony utilizing the Daubert four-factor test and determined that
none of the four admissibility criteria had been utilized .3  The
court explicitly rejected plaintiffs argument that Daubert-style
scrutiny was inapplicable. °
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit was asked to determine
whether Daubert applied. The Eleventh Circuit reviewed both
the trial court's legal decision to apply Daubert de novo and evi-
dentiary decision to exclude the expert's testimony for abuse of
discretion.41 The Eleventh Circuit concluded the Daubert crite-
ria did not apply; however, the court stated, "the inapplicability
of Daubert should not end the day regarding [the expert's] reli-
ability. Under Rule 702, it is the district court's duty to deter-
mine if [the expert's] testimony is sufficiently reliable and
relevant to assist a jury. "42
Kumho Tire petitioned the Supreme Court of the United
States asking, "whether a trial court 'may' consider Daubert's
specific 'factors' when determining the 'admissibility of an engi-
neering expert's testimony.' ,,43 The Supreme Court responded,
"[e]mphasizing the word 'may' in the question, we answer that
to the purchase by Carmichael and had not been replaced. The service history of
the tire was unknown and the tread depth at the time of the accident varied
between 0/32" and 3/32" inches. Id.
36 See id. Plaintiff's testifying expert replaced a previously-hired expert. The tes-
tifying expert looked at photos taken by the prior expert and adopted this prior
expert's report and opinions almost verbatim. The testifying expert did not ex-
amine the tire before issuing his report. Id.
37 See id. at 1518.
38 See id. at 1518-19.
- See id. at 1520-21.
40 See id. at 1521-22.
41 See Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1435 (11th Cir. 1997).
42 Id. Of course, relevance and reliability are the two factors specifically set
forth in the Daubert holding. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
43 Kumho Tire Co v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 146 (1999) (quoting Kumho
Tire petition for certiorari).
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question yes .... Our emphasis on the word 'may' thus reflects
Daubert's description of a Rule 702 inquiry as 'a flexible one.'44
The Supreme Court also addressed the deference afforded
the trial court in evidentiary rulings stating:
Our opinion in Joiner makes clear that a court of appeals is to
apply an abuse-of-discretion standard when it 'review[s] a trial
court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony'. That stan-
dard applies as much to the trial court's decisions about how to
determine reliability as to its ultimate conclusion .... Thus,
whether Daubert's specific factors are, or are not, reasonable
measures of reliability in a particular case is a matter that the law
grants the trial judge broad latitude to determine.45
We, as practitioners, must function within the Daubert, Joiner,
and Kumho framework. As such, an examination of the methods
by which lower courts have chosen to examine expert testimony
is instructive. In aviation litigation, practitioners encounter
many experts. Fortunately, a great deal of analysis has been con-
ducted regarding the types of experts we commonly confront.
III. THE EXPERTS
Houghton v. Port Terminal R.R. Ass'n 46 involved Plaintiff
Houghton, an engineer employed by the defendant. He alleg-
edly injured his back when the seat "in which he was sitting sepa-
rated from its mounting as a result of a hard impact from a
coupling of the railroad cars. ' 47 Mr. Houghton sued the defen-
dant under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) for neg-
ligence, and under the Boiler Inspection Act (BIA). Houghton
alleged the brakes and engineer's seat were not in proper condi-
tion. A jury found in favor of the defendant and plaintiff ap-
pealed. Plaintiff assigned as error the trial court's granting of
the defendant railroad company's pretrial Motion to Exclude
the Testimony of the Plaintiffs expert, Charles Colver, on the
grounds that Mr. Colver was not qualified to testify on locomo-
tive breaks.48
At trial plaintiff sought to have the expert deliver three opin-
ions: "(1) the manner in which the engine seat could become
misaligned; (2) the fact that rough coupling of the two cars oc-
44 Id. at 150.
45 Id. at 152-53. (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
46 999 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. App. 1999).
47 Id. at 43.
48 See id. at 47.
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curred in the accident; and (3) the engine breaks caused the
rough coupling or contributed to the impact."49 The trial judge
excluded the expert testimony regarding the rough coupling of
the cars. The trial judge allowed Colver to testify as to his opin-
ion regarding the engineer seat, but not as an expert because no
expertise was needed to show how the seat became misaligned.
With regard to the remaining issue, he was not allowed to testify
about his belief that the brakes could have caused the
coupling.50
The Court of Appeals began by setting forth the standard.51
The court explained:
[t] he role of the trial court in qualifying experts is to ensure 'that
those who purport to be experts truly have expertise concerning
the actual subject about which they are offering an opinion.'5 2
* . . General experience in a specialized field does not [necessa-
rily] qualify a witness as an expert. 'What is required is that the
offering party establish that the expert has "knowledge, skill, ex-
perience, training or education" regarding the specific issue
before the court which would qualify the expert to give an opin-
ion on that particular subject.' 'And when a party can show
that a subject is substantially developed in more than one field,
testimony can come from a qualified expert in any of those
fields.' 54
On appeal the court reviewed the expert's experience with
engine brakes. Mr. Culver had been employed by Union Pacific
Railroad for over twenty years as a welder helper, engineer, and
a technical trainer. He did not work "as a switchman, a brake-
man, a conductor, yardmaster, trainmaster, a machinist or a
mechanic."55 Mr. Culver was qualified as an "instructor for oper-
ating rules, air brakes, safety, and radio rules" and had received
advanced training in freight car, air brake equipment, locomo-
tive air brakes, and electropneuimatic equipment through West-
49 Id. at 48.
50 Id.
51 See id. at 47. The trial judge fulfilled this obligation by determining as a pre-
condition to admissibility that (1) the expert is qualified as such; (2) the expert's
testimony had a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the relevant
discipline; and (3) the testimony was relevant. Id.
52 Houghton v. Part Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 924 S.W.2d 39 (Tex App. 1999) (cit-
ing Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex. 1996)).
53 Id. (citing Broders, 924 S.W.2d at 153-54 in turn quoting TEx. R. Civ. EvD.
702).
54 Id. (citing Broders, 924 SW.2d at 154).
55 Id. at 48.
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inghouse Air Break Company."56 The court of appeals noted
that the record did not reflect Mr. Culver's experience or ad-
vanced training qualifying him to render expert testimony on
the specific issues of the case.57 This was so, even though, as the
appellate court noted, Mr. Culver was self-employed as a consult-
ant to litigators and the federal government. Despite this experi-
ence, the Houghton court determined that Mr. Culver did not
acquire the specialized knowledge with which to testify about
the "specific issues within the case, i.e., the effect of flat spots on
braking, engine speed, and the forces generated on coupling of
railroad cars."58 Thus, the district court's exclusion of the testi-
mony was proper.
In Freeman v. Witco Corp.,59 defendant Witco filed a Motion in
Limine to limit the testimony of the proffered expert, Louis D.
Chauser. Defendant Witco challenged Mr. Chauser's experience
and education, as well as his methodology and investigation of
the accident at issue so as to make his conclusions and opinions
unreliable.
After citing the Daubert standard for admission of reliable and
relevant evidence, the court noted that Mr. Chauser did not
have a college degree, and was not an engineer, metallurgist, or
chemist. Although his deposition testimony indicated that he
was an electrician by training, he had no formal education. And,
despite the fact that Mr. Chauser was a safety consultant, his in-
vestigation of the accident showed he did not visit the Witco
plant site where the accident occurred. He did not see any pho-
tographs of the location of the accident, did not inspect the
King Vac vacuum truck involved in the accident or any photo-
graphs of the truck. Mr. Chauser did not inspect any similar
trucks except "casually looking at one for 'no more than a min-
ute.'- 60 The proffered expert had not examined any drawings or
diagrams of the truck and admitted that he had "no expertise or
experience regarding carbon disulfide or its properties. ' 61 Ac-
cordingly, the Freeman court determined that he was merely
56 Id.
57 See id.
58 Specifically the court noted, "the record is silent as to whether Culver's ex-
perience and advanced training qualified him to testify about the effect of flat
spots on braking, engine speed, and the forces generated in the coupling of rail-
road cars or whether he has merely qualified to testify about braking procedures
and safety rules." Id.
59 No. 97-1448, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16124 (E.D. La. Oct. 15, 1999).
6 Id. at *4.
61 Id.
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qualified to testify about breaking procedures and safety rules.
The testimony of Mr. Chauser regarding the accident was not
sufficiently reliable and was excluded.
Comer v. Am. Elec. Powe 2 involved a plaintiff who owned a
house in West Winchester, Indiana, which was supplied electric-
ity service by the defendant American Electric Power. The wires
providing the electricity were connected to a transformer and
secondary conductor located on a utility pole in the northwest
corner of the plaintiffs property. Two wires (described as
"hot"), which transported 120 volts each, ran from the trans-
former into the panel distribution box where the two "hot" wires
were protected by insulation. The court noted that the typical
service rating for the insulation was 600 volts.
On February 4, 1996, a fire occurred at the plaintiffs resi-
dence resulting in $141,980.40 in damages. The record reflects
that the chief of the Winchester Fire Department testified at
trial that the fire originated in the panel distribution box inside
the plaintiffs garage. The proffered expert, Dr. Nine, testified
that the two hot wires failed causing electricity between the un-
protected wire and metal door to "arc." Both witnesses agreed
that this condition burned holes through the door of the panel
box and caused the garage to catch fire. The evidence indicated
that around the time of the fire, neighbors also using the plain-
tiff's transformer experienced electrical problems, specifically
damage to electrical appliances such as garage door openers,
video game systems, televisions, VCRs, answering machines, and
washing machines.
Dr. Nine explained the process of "arcing" as "a phenomenon
in which electricity passes through the air that has been ionized,
and when that happens, you get heats that are in excess-well
they're thousands of degrees. And in arcing, that's always ac-
companied by the melting of metal, even steel, and steel takes
several thousand degrees to melt. So arcing is a high tempera-
"163ture phenomenon....
The witnesses disagreed about the cause of this arcing condi-
tion. Dr. Nine testified that a high voltage phenomenon of some
sort caused damage to the protective insulation on the wires in
the panel distribution box. The chief of the fire department dis-
agreed and attributed the arcing to defects in the wires within
the panel distribution box rather than abnormally high voltage.
62 63 F. Supp. 2d 927 (N.D. Ind. 1999).
63 Id. at 932 n. 5.
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The testimony of Dr. Nine was challenged as to reliability and
relevancy.
With regard to reliability, the defendant challenged Dr.
Nine's lack of personal knowledge, as well as the fact that there
were obvious discrepancies between Dr. Nine's deposition and
his testimony offered at trial. The testimony offered at trial indi-
cated that, in his opinion, a voltage surge occurred on February
4th that immediately caused the insulation on the wires in the
panel to fail. This, in turn, lead to arcing between the exposed
wires and the metal panel distribution box causing the fire. But
the deposition testimony was quite different. Specifically, the
deposition testimony reflected that any damage was not suffi-
cient at the time of the power surge to cause an immediate
breakdown of the insulation, but instead occurred over at pe-
riod of two days.
The court noted the "glaring temporal discrepancy"64 be-
tween the deposition testimony and that offered at trial. The
court concluded that this discrepancy revealed that the expert
did not have any particular fact or observation on which to base
the testimony, but instead was only told at what time the fire
occurred.
The defendant also challenged Dr. Nine's conclusion that a
"loose neutral" caused the power voltage surge, which, in turn,
caused the fire. Dr. Nine testified that the neutral came loose at
a connection and that the neutral could not have been broken
because the other homes that were served by the transformer
had electrical power the day after the fire. However, the court
noted that there was no basis in the record to support the "loose
neutral" conclusion and, in fact, that the evidence indicated the
opposite. A review of the record indicated that a service call, on
February 6th regarding the same transformer and the power
utility lines, pertained to a broken neutral, not a loose neutral.
When challenged on cross-examination, Dr. Nine acknowledged
that he had no first-hand knowledge that the neutral was loose,
but countered by saying that the neutral could have been loose.
Even Dr. Nine characterized the opinion as a "supposition based
on the events. ' 65 The court concluded that Dr. Nine's opinion
was a conclusory supposition and not based on specific facts
presented from the record. This testimony was not sufficiently
64 Id. at 935.
65 Id. at 936.
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supported so as to be admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence
702 or Daubert.
The defense also challenged Dr. Nine's contention that there
was an equipment problem in the distribution substation. In a
supplemental report following his deposition, Dr. Nine opined
that the probable cause for the voltage surges was an equipment
problem in the distribution substation. Yet he admitted at trial
that there was no evidence to support his conclusion. In fact, Dr.
Nine reviewed various weather, fire, and police incident reports
to determine if any such incident could have caused the alleged
surge. Despite the fact that there were no such reports and no
other facts on which to determine what caused the voltage
surge, Dr. Nine nonetheless offered this unsubstantiated opin-
ion. Concluding the liability portion of the decision, the Comer
court determined that the expert opinion offered by Dr. Nine
was "generally lacking in factual support, sometimes inexplica-
bly contradictory, and occasionally devoid of any plausible ratio-
nale."66 Ultimately, this opinion was nothing more than
subjective belief without factual support or a technical/scientific
foundation.
With regard to relevance, the court determined that even as-
suming arguendo that Dr. Nine's testimony was reliable, it was
not relevant to the inquiry at hand. The central issue that the
jury would determine was a matter of state law, i.e., whether the
defendant was liable for the fire because the electricity supplied
to the plaintiffs house was "in defective condition, unreasonably
dangerous to the consumer or user. ' 67 The court determined
that Dr. Nine's testimony did not assist the jury in determining
whether the electricity supplied by the defendant was unreason-
ably dangerous.68
66 Id. at 938.
67 Id. at 939.
68 See Comer, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 939. The court reviewed Indiana law to deter-
mine what standards were considered, noting that some courts apply the con-
sumer expectation test to electricity such that they developed a general rule that
electric voltage is dangerously defective when far in excess of the level intended
by the utility. The court cited generally Bryant v. Tri-County Elec. Membership
Corp., 844 F. Supp. 347, 350 (W.D. Ky. 1994) ("electric voltage is dangerously
defective when it is far in excess of the level intended by the utility and expected
by the customer"). See also Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 287,
287 n.1 (*1985) ("It goes without saying that 7000 volts was far in excess of [de-
fendant's] intended result and in excess, as well, of plaintiffs reasonable expecta-
tions."). The court also noted electricity is not necessarily defective when a
voltage variance occurs and when such variance is minimal or when the home-
owner is in a better position to control the variance. See Bryant, 844 F. Supp. at
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The court reviewed Indiana law to determine that Indiana's
standard for obtaining property damage in products liability ac-
tions was limited to "sudden and major" damage. Under the ap-
plicable statute, major is defined as greater in number or extent,
notable or considerable in effect or scope, or involving grave
risk, which the court noted denotes some qualitative relation-
ship, either in number or extent, to the damage. Looking to Dr.
Nine's testimony, the court determined that it did not assist the
jury in determining whether the electricity supplied was unrea-
sonably dangerous. Specifically, the court noted that Dr. Nine
testified the level of voltage was identical for all five houses ser-
viced by the transformer with the allegedly loose neutral. The
only explanation offered by Dr. Nine was that the insulation pro-
tecting the wires running to the plaintiffs house was weaker
than that running to the other four houses. The court deter-
mined that this supposition testimony did not assist the jury in
determining whether the electricity was unreasonably danger-
ous, much less tending to prove the same. The court concluded
that Dr. Nine's testimony was properly stricken, should have
been excluded from the jury's consideration, and that the Mo-
tion for Judgment as a Matter of Law was warranted.
In Nemir v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of Am. Corp.,6 9 the plaintiff
brought suit against Mitsubishi Motor Corporation and Chrysler
Corporation alleging a defectively designed seatbelt. Plaintiff al-
leged that while driving his car southbound on a two-lane road
in Maryland, he lost control of the car and swung out to the
right. Plaintiff Nemir suffered several injuries when he was
thrown from the driver's seat into the back seat where he struck
his head on a pillar in the rear right of the vehicle. Nemir filed
suit alleging that the seatbelt was defectively designed. He re-
tained an expert that did tests to demonstrate that Nemir's
seatbelt could have suffered from a defect called "partial en-
gagement." It is this expert testimony that the defendants chal-
lenged. Specifically, defendants contended that the plaintiff
failed to present any evidence demonstrating that partial latch-
ing actually occurred in this case. Further, they contended that
the results were unreliable for various reasons including: the
350 ("opining that 500 volts might not be unreasonably dangerous because cur-
rents up to 600 volts could be controlled most economically by the homeowner");
Elgin Airport Inn, Inc. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 432 N.E. 2d 259 (holding
that the electricity provided was not unreasonably dangerous when the voltage
surge was only minimal).
69 60 F. Supp. 2d 660 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
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methods employed, the fact that sample buckles were obtained
from salvage yards, the fact that one latch plate was used for the
several buckles during the testing, and the expert's failure to
record the details of the test.
In reviewing the expert's testimony for reliability, the court
indicated that the plaintiff must demonstrate the methods used
were representative of actual use. Otherwise, facts generally re-
garding seatbelts would not assist the jury in deciding the facts
of a particular case.
The court ultimately determined that the expert's methods
were not representative of the actual use of the seatbelt. Specifi-
cally, his methods to achieve the partial latch or engagement
were too purposeful and painstaking in their manipulation of
the buckle. The court considered that actual seatbelt users do
not undertake such efforts to achieve the partial latch.
Additionally, the expert's basic expertise was challenged. The
court determined that his experience did not extend beyond
seatbelt design and testing. The court noted that the expert's
tests involved careful manipulation of the buckle and could not
be approximated by inadvertence.
With regard to the issue of reliability, the court determined
that the expert's theories failed to meet the Daubert framework.
Initially, the court noted that he did not record all of his testing
procedures, but rather recorded only the numerical results of
his test. This left the sole source of information as to the man-
ner in which the tests were conducted to his own "after-the-fact"
account of what happened. The accuracy of these tests turned
upon his ability to recall precisely what occurred during the
tests. Further, his recollection was incomplete as to at least one
issue.
The court made two initial conclusions based on these facts.
Even if the methods were relevant, the results did not indicate
that partially engaged buckles (on the TK52 series buckle) were
defectively designed or that they violated the federal motor vehi-
cle safety standards, as the tests and results were well within the
five pounds allowed under the federal standard. Rather, it was
only when the calculated maneuvering of the seatbelts took
place that the expert began obtaining results of the partial latch
theory.
The court next considered the testability of the expert's the-
ory. Applying his theory to a simple example of empirical testing
to reproduce what actually occurred, the court determined that
there was in fact no physical evidence of any damage or undue
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wear to the buckle to prove that any partial latching occurred.
Further, the court noted that there was no way to test the ex-
pert's own hypothesis or testing, either by empirical testing or
otherwise.
The court then considered the peer review and publication
aspects of the Daubert inquiry. Noting that the lack of peer re-
view is not always dispositive as to the issue of admissibility, the
court acknowledged that there was no peer review or scrutiny by
the scientific community with regard to this expert's theory.
The court next addressed the potential error rate from his
testing. The court's first observation was that the expert's use of
several different buckle mechanisms (most of which were col-
lected from a salvage yard) as applied to only one switch plate
may have injected an unknown error rate into the tests. The
court then considered the issue of general acceptance, and spe-
cifically noted that while partial engagement or latching is re-
ferred to by the federal motor vehicle safety standards, there was
no proof that the expert's methods of testing these latches was
generally accepted. In so far as the federal standard required
testing to be done by any means that is representative of actual
use, the methods employed by him were not so. Ultimately then,
the court concluded the expert's testimony was neither reliable
nor relevant. Specifically, the court concluded that his determi-
nation that the buckle was not defectively designed, but rather
was defective because it took an unreasonable amount of force
to separate the buckles, was somewhat different than the defect
asserted by the plaintiffs. Without the testing, plaintiff could not
prove the alleged defect.
Culbertson v. Freightliner Corp.7° is a case in which the proffered
expert was well educated, but the court determined there was
not enough proof to allow the testimony. The plaintiff, Sam Cul-
bertson, claimed to have suffered back injuries when his tractor
seat bottomed out as he drove over uneven portions of a high-
way. He claimed this injury was the result of a defect in the seat
of the tractor he was driving for defendant Freightliner, but
presented no evidence except that of his expert witness. The
expert was a mechanical engineer and was offered to support
plaintiffs testimony for his claims of design defect and failure to
warn.
The court determined that the proffered expert testimony
was unreliable, and in doing so adopted a summary by the de-
70 50 F. Supp. 2d 998 (D. Nev. 1999).
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fendants of portions of the deposition testimony. Specifically,
the proffered expert: (1) had never given expert testimony with
respect to the functioning of air ride seats or of the suspension
of a tractor as it related to an air ride seat; (2) had never been
involved in the design or modification of the suspension of an
air ride seat; (3) had never seen the seat in question; (4) had
never reviewed the maintenance records of the seat in question;
(5) did not review the deposition testimony of any of the wit-
nesses in this case, including that of the plaintiff or the plain-
tiff's employer; (6) spent only one hour looking at the tractor in
question without the seat at issue; (7) did not perform any tests;
(8) did not review any literature or texts in preparation for any
of the opinions developed in the case; (9) did not prepare any
reports or correspondence relating to the case; (10) had no sci-
entific, mechanical, or other data to back up the opinion; (11)
did not cite any industry standards, manufacturing data, outside
studies, documentary research, published articles, or treatises
that would support his position; and (12) did not run a control
group or conduct other research.
The court determined that the opinion was merely conclusory
and failed to provide facts to support it. It also noted that al-
though affidavits of other experts supported the principals em-
ployed by the expert in that they were consistent with standards
of mechanical engineering, this opinion was educated at best,
and did not provide specific facts so as to assist the jury in deter-
mining the issue at hand.
In Pillow v. General Motors Corp.,71 plaintiff alleged that the
brake system of her 1988 Chevrolet van failed, which caused her
to suffer ankle injuries when her van collided with the rear end
of a pickup truck. Specifically, Pillow complained the brakes
were defectively designed and that the crush space in the front
driver's side of the van was also defectively designed, such that it
caused the brake pedal to be violently thrust toward the driver's
right foot whenever the van made contact or impact with the
rear of another vehicle. To support this contention, plaintiff
proffered an expert to testify that the design of the master cylin-
der and brake system was defective because it allowed forces
placed on the master cylinder to transmit to the brake pedal.
General Motors moved to exclude the testimony arguing that it
was neither relevant nor reliable.
71 184 F.R.D. 304 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
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Agreeing with General Motors, the court determined that be-
cause the expert did not conduct an independent crash test of
the model, his theory had not been adequately tested. Accord-
ing to the court, the expert relied on a video taped crash test.
This taped test was too different from plaintiff's crash to be suffi-
ciently reliable. Specifically, the court noted that the video
taped crash test showed a man striking a fixed and immovable
barrier at a speed and angle different from the accident at issue.
These were not a sufficiently similar set of facts to prove the
opinion proffered. Ultimately, the court determined that this
testimony consisted of mainly untested and unsubstantiated
opinions. Additionally, the court noted that the theories of the
expert had not been subjected to peer review and that there was
no known error rate. The expert testimony was therefore
excluded.
In Jarvis v. Ford Motor Co.,7" the plaintiff was seriously injured
when the 1991 Ford Aerostar she was driving suddenly acceler-
ated after being started. The van traveled 330 feet, eventually
crashing into a drainage ditch. The plaintiff testified that she
attempted to stop the vehicle by stepping on the brake pedal
with both feet.
Plaintiff proffered the testimony of Mr. Sero. Mr. Sero pro-
posed to testify about three conditions under which the van
could have accelerated from the stationery position without the
driver engaging the accelerator or the cruise control. Ford
moved to exclude the testimony as unreliable.
Mr. Sero had three theories regarding how the car could have
accelerated so suddenly: (1) if a ground connection to the
speed amplifier is opened and removed, and either the vacuum
wire or vent wire is grounded; (2) if both the vent and vacuum
wire are grounded at the same time; or (3) if an injected signal
on or into the amplifier fires the output transistors. The expert
considered the possibility of sudden acceleration resulting from
an electrical fault that causes a "completion of the electrical cir-
cuit from the car's battery to the cruise control. 7 3
The expert offered two solutions or options that might have
prevented the sudden acceleration. The expert believed that the
problem could be solved by: (1) installing of an on/off switch
on the cruise control that would allow power only when the
72 69 F. Supp. 2d 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
73 Jarvis v. Ford Motor Corp., 1999 WL 461813, *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 1999)
(Magistrate Judge's Memorandum and Order).
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cruise control was in use; or (2) installing of a device that would
sense a grounding problem and immediately stop the
acceleration.
Ford contended that the testimony of the expert was unrelia-
ble in that his propositions had not been physically verified in
an actual vehicle, had not been submitted for peer review, had
not gained general acceptance in the engineering community,
and had not been subject to a statistical analysis. Furthermore,
Ford asserted these propositions were refuted by a 1989 report
by the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration.
The district court concluded that the expert officially tested
and replicated the first two of his theories on a model automo-
bile that accurately reflected the electrical components that
were available in the 1991 Ford Aerostar. The court properly
noted that although the findings have not been published or
subject to peer review, that alone did not render them unrelia-
ble. The court went on to find that the expert's approach char-
acterized as a "failure mode analysis" lacked support from the
engineering community. The judge acknowledged that the find-
ings were subject to criticism, but that such criticisms are "di-
rected at conclusions that can be drawn from Sero's findings
rather than his methodology. ' 74 Additionally, the court indi-
cated the reliability of the expert's findings was confirmed by
Ford's own internal documents that showed Ford considered
such a cruise control problem. This testimony was properly
admitted.
In Guild v. General Motors Corp.,75 the plaintiff Carol Guild
claimed her 1987 Oldsmobile Cutlass was not crashworthy in
that it was equipped with defective and unsafe seatbelts. Specifi-
cally, she alleged that the seatbelts were defective, dangerous,
and unsafe because certain crash settings and inertial forces
generated during a collision caused the seat belt to release and
subsequently unlatch. Plaintiff claimed that in 1993, while wear-
ing her seatbelt, she collided with another automobile. Despite
wearing the seatbelt, she suffered serious injuries.
The parties filed several pretrial Motions in Limine. Specifi-
cally, General Motors contended that the testimony of plaintiffs
proffered experts, Dr. James Pugh and Dr. Malcolm Newman,
was unreliable and not scientifically valid.
74 Id. at *6.
75 53 F. Supp. 2d 363 (W.D.N.Y. 1999).
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The court first considered their qualifications. Dr. Pugh had a
Ph.D. in biomedical engineering and obtained a Bachelor of
Science in metallurgy and materials from M.I.T. The court
noted that Dr. Pugh was currently the director of biomedical
engineering, metallurgy, and materials science of Inter-City
Testing and Consulting Corporation. Dr. Newman held degrees
in civil engineering from the City College of New York and Co-
lumbia University, and an engineering science degree from New
York University. Dr Newman was the president and consulting
engineer of biomedical engineering, metallurgy, and materials
science of Inter-City Testing and Consulting Corporation. Both
experts published technical articles in engineering and scien-
tific journals, and had previously served as expert witnesses.
The court then considered the theories proffered by the ex-
perts. "Inertial release" is a theory that has its grounding in prin-
cipals of science and of physics. It was formed on the basis of a
number of studies and tests, including extensive testing by
N.H.T.S.A. and by General Motors itself thus, it was not a novel
theory developed by plaintiffs experts.
The experts conducted several tests and made their conclu-
sions on many factors. Specifically, Dr. Pugh indicated his report
and deposition testimony was based in medical records, medical
images, witness statements, reports, and copies of photographs
depicting the plaintiff's vehicle at the time of the accident. Dr.
Pugh also reviewed photographs showing the contusion dam-
ages to the plaintiffs body. He inspected the vehicle, the acci-
dent scene, and met with family members. Similarly, Dr.
Newman reviewed deposition testimony, witness statements,
copies of photos depicting the vehicle, and various reports con-
cerning the accident.
General Motors asserted that plaintiffs experts' reliance on
the slap test was unreliable. The court noted however that the
slap test did not form the entire basis of the experts' opinion.
Plaintiff asserted that both expert opinions were based on en-
gineering drawings and specifications for the plaintiffs vehicle
involved in the accident. With regard to the force required to
release a seatbelt mechanism, the experts used several U.S. pat-
ents, the slap test, and other information provided during dis-
covery from General Motors, including car crash tests, frontal
impact sled tests, General Motors memoranda, and prior cus-
tomer complaints regarding the unlatching of the buckle.
The court considered the fact that experts for both parties
came to different opinions regarding the cause of the accident
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or the cause of plaintiffs damages. The court noted that al-
though both experts cited to a number of studies and reports,
such differences of opinion will go to the weight to be given to
the expert testimony by the jury, not its admissibility. The court
concluded that there was sufficient evidence in the record to
indicate plaintiffs experts had extensive experience and educa-
tion in the fields in which they proposed to testify, and there was
a reasonable basis to believe their testimony would be helpful to
the jury in assessing the plaintiffs allegations against General
Motors.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
proffered experts as general versus specific in Kinser v. Gehl Co.76
The plaintiff, Mary Kinser, on behalf of herself and her de-
ceased husband's estate, filed a products liability action against
Gehl Company alleging strict liability for manufacturing and
selling an unreasonably dangerous product, negligent design
and manufacture, and breach of implied warranty (not fit for its
intended use).
The claim arose from an accident on August 17, 1994. The
decedent, Tim Kinser, operated a farm in Jennings, Kansas.
While baling alfalfa with his Gehl model 1817 Big Round Baler,
Kinser became entangled up to his waist in the compression roll-
ers of the baler's feed intake unit. A witness on the scene noted
the tractor's engine was on and the power take-off device, which
transmits power from the tractor to the bailer, was still engaged.
The witness turned off the machinery and attempted to assist
Kinser in extricating him from the baler. The witness obtained
assistance from another farmer and used bumper jacks and an
acetylene torch to free Kinser. He was pronounced dead within
thirty minutes of his arrival at the hospital.
Much of the subsequent trial focused on the designs of the
Big Round Baler. Prior to trial, defendant Gehl challenged the
qualifications of plaintiffs expert witness and requested a
Daubert hearing to assess the reliability and relevance of the prof-
fered testimony. Under precedent at that time in the Tenth Cir-
cuit, Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc.,77 the district court was
not required to hold a Daubert hearing. The court of appeals
noted the review then would be difficult, as determinations
under a Daubert analysis are usually examined only for abuse of
discretion. Having no findings to review, the court decided to
76 184 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 1999).
77 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1996).
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review the entire record, including the testimony presented at
trial.
The plaintiff proffered an expert who held a bachelor's de-
gree in mechanical engineering, a doctorate in industrial engi-
neering, and had taught classes on product design ergonomics.
He served as a consultant for agricultural manufacturers in liti-
gation on various occasions by analyzing the adequacy of warn-
ing instructions on certain farm equipment. He had also
published related articles.
Despite these credentials, the court determined the expert
was not qualified to testify as an expert in the areas of possible
alternative design. The court cited the expert's own acknowledg-
ment that he had no practical experience in mechanical design.
The court noted that he had no expertise with regard to design
of products under traditional engineering methods, had never
published a paper examining any type of agricultural equip-
ment, never operated a Big Round Baler, and never consulted
on behalf of a plaintiff or manufacturer regarding Big Round
Balers. Additionally, the court noted that the expert did not
speak with any individual regarding their experience with Big
Round Balers, save reviewing deposition testimony of those in-
volved in this case. Additionally the court considered the ex-
pert's testimony, where he conceded the recommended
changes in the 1870 baler design were merely concepts, neither
developed nor tested with regard to feasibility or safety.
Plaintiff's second expert had a bachelor's degree in mechani-
cal engineering and at the time worked for a forensic engineer
at his own consulting firm. He focused on product and vehicle
accident reconstruction. He did not, however, attempt to recon-
struct Kinser's injuries. To prepare for his testimony, the expert
reviewed the depositions of several farmers, took measurements
of and observed the repaired 1870 baler, and examined industry
standard publications in various baler manufactures' operator's
manuals. The second expert acknowledged that he had never
designed a piece of agricultural equipment or even operated a
similar baler. Additionally, he conceded that he had not ad-
hered to the generally accepted engineering methodology
before testifying on possible design changes for the baler. Essen-
tially, the expert reviewed the "production run of similar guard-
ing utilized by John Deere." 8
78 Kinser, 184 F.3d at 1272.
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Analyzing these qualifications, the court noted that several cir-
cuits suggested the testing of alternative design proposals as a
critical component of the reliability of an expert's opinion.
While hands-on testing is not an absolute prerequisite, the relia-
bility of proposed design changes would be increased. The court
concluded with regard to the experts that both opinions lacked
the adequate foundation of reliability.
However, their opinion as to the guarding or safety mecha-
nisms was proper. Citing substantive state law in Kansas, a signifi-
cant factor in determining due care with regard to design of a
product is whether others in the industry use the same design,
or a safer design. Thus, the testimony by the experts referencing
John Deere standards was appropriate. The court concluded
that any error was harmless and that the Motion for a new trial
was thus unwarranted.
In Jaurequi v. Carter Manufacturing Co.,79 plaintiff Juan Jaure-
qui brought a diversity action against the John Deere Company
alleging that design and warning defects associated with a John
Deere corn head, or combine, caused an accident in which
Jaurequi's legs were amputated. Prior to trial, John Deere
moved for the exclusion of the plaintiff's proffered expert
testimony.
The plaintiff, Juan Jaurequi, was an employee of Texas Tri-
umph Seed Company when the injuries giving rise to the suit
occurred. The combine at issue in the case was manufactured
and sold byJohn Deere in 1974. In 1986, Carter Manufacturing
acquired the used combine on behalf of Texas Triumph. Carter
reconstructed a special unit out of a 1961 Massey Harris com-
bine to be specially suited for harvesting small test plots of corn.
That new combination of combines was good only for a research
plot of corn. John Deere was never informed or consulted with
regard to the additions or modifications to the unit.
On the day he was injured, the plaintiff, along with other em-
ployees, was using the modified combine to harvest milo/sor-
ghum. The unit had not been constructed with this use in mind
and was incapable of harvesting standing milo. Instead, the
workers would hand pick the milo, stand next to the operating
machine, and dump the bags onto a cross auger at the rear of
the corn head at a point behind the combine. This was neces-
sary because Texas Triumph neglected to bring its harvester to
the test plots. On the day of the accident, the plaintiff was per-
79 173 F.3d 1076 (8th Cir. 1999)
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forming similar tasks with regard to the milo and the operating
machine. The plaintiff was warned twice by a co-worker that he
should not feed the corn head from the front because he risked
being pulled in by moving parts. On one such occasion he
moved too close and his legs became entangled in the machin-
ery. Plaintiff sustained severe injuries to both legs leaving him a
double amputee.
Plaintiff proffered two experts, Terrence Willis and Harold
Wakely. Willis was a mechanical engineer and was prepared to
testify the Jaurequi was not provided the necessary details that
would identify where the hazard zone ended and the safety re-
gion began, and that such specific information cannot be deter-
mined visually because of the speed at which the gathering
chains suddenly emerged from under the snout end of the ma-
chines. Willis opined that although the motion of the gathering
chains of the machinery was open and obvious, the risk was not
obvious at the point at which the plaintiff was standing. The area
where gathering chains and hooks emerged was invisible, ac-
cording to Willis, because the chains and hooks moved so fast.
However, Willis admitted that he had never observed the com-
bine at issue when it was running and that he had never seen a
corn head combine in operation except from the roadside dur-
ing his various trips through the Illinois country side. The basis
of his opinion was stated as simply, "I guess as an engineer, I
know what it looks like in the running mode."80
Willis also believed that the combine should have been
equipped with a larger and more prominent warning. In addi-
tion, Willis proposed a plastic cover snout area colored with
black and yellow stripes. He speculated in an affidavit that the
warnings, had they been designed as he suggested, would not
have been painted over. However, he admitted that he had no
basis for this belief.
Furthermore, in his affidavit, the proffered expert Willis
stated that Jaurequi was not warned of the specific hazards of
operating in the zone in front of the combine. However, in his
deposition, Willis admitted that he had not evaluated the plain-
tiff's behavior and focused his analysis on the question of
whether the mechanical design of the corn head combine was
defective. Willis admitted that he did not know what the plaintiff
knew or did not know.
80 Id. at 1080.
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Willis also proffered the opinion that John Deere should have
incorporated "awareness barriers" into the combine. He again
opined that these barriers would create safety and would not
interfere with the operation of the machine. He admitted, how-
ever, that he had not studied the feasibility of such barriers nor
designed and tested such barriers. He further admitted that he
was unaware of any such studies indicating the effectiveness of
these barriers. And he had never before designed any barriers of
this kind. Finally, Willis admitted that he was aware of no manu-
facturer of these combines who had ever used barriers in front
of the gathering area as he proposed could be done.
The court evaluated the proffered testimony in light of
Daubert and Kumho. The court noted specifically that Willis had
not attempted to construct or draw the suggested devices, much
less test the utility of the safety devices or their compatibility
with the combine. The court took note that no manufacturer
incorporated these "awareness barriers" into their corn head
combines or other similar farming machinery. The court deter-
mined that Willis provided no basis to believe his testimony. His
opinions were nothing more than "unabashed speculation."8'
The court determined that the district court did not err or
abuse its discretion by excluding the proffered testimony regard-
ing the lack of awareness barriers.
Harold Wakely, the second proffered expert, was a human
factors engineer who held a doctorate in experimental psychol-
ogy. Wakely was prepared to testify that the combine was defec-
tive because the original warning signs were too small, too far
from the point of danger, and oriented at an angle that made it
difficult for them to be read. Wakely was prepared to testify that
the warning did not emphasize the precise point at which the
danger was concentrated. However, he admitted that he had
never read the original warnings and did not know what the
original warnings actually said. Nonetheless, Wakely opined that
the alternative warnings were necessary because the gathering
hook on the gathering chain was not visible at any time of dan-
ger. Wakely submitted an affidavit in which he stated that al-
though the plaintiff had been warned by his co-workers of the
general dangers associated with the combine, he was not aware
of the exact location of danger.
Wakely admitted that he found no product of any kind or vin-
tage that employed the types of warning stripes he suggested.
81 Id. at 1084.
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He speculated in his deposition that John Deere could have
made the protection snouts of plastic and that this might have
made it difficult to paint over any warnings. When pressed, he
admitted that he had no basis for saying how long or if paint
would stay on that plastic snout protection. In the affidavit,
Wakely stated that the high contrast plastic snouts and warnings
used by Hege and New Idea since 1964 would have produced a
more effective warning. In a subsequent deposition however,
Wakely admitted he had no knowledge of those protective
snouts being used on combines at or before the time that the
combine at issue in this case was manufactured.
Again, the district court reviewed Wakely's proffered testi-
mony in light of the Daubert and Kumho holdings. The court con-
cluded that the testimony offered by Wakely appeared
unreliable in that the proffered expert had never designed or
created a warning device like he suggested. In fact, Wakely ad-
mitted he had never even read the warnings that John Deere
employed. Additionally, the expert pointed to no other manu-
facturers of farm machinery that were employing these
measures.
Finally, after considering the proffered testimony for its relia-
bility, the court considered the issue of relevance. The court
noted that while it was undisputed that the combine's warning
had twice been painted over by persons other than John Deere,
neither expert had a basis for concluding that warnings they
proposed "would have escaped either painter's brush. '82 But
the inadequacies of the content could not be considered a cause
in fact of the plaintiffs injuries. As such, the proffered testimony
was not relevant to the inquiry at hand.
Hammond v. Coleman Co.8" was a products liability suit alleging
defective design of a lantern, manufacturing defects in the lan-
tern, and inadequate warnings and instructions as to the use of a
lantern. The plaintiff David Hammond filled a Coleman lantern
with fuel on the outside of his mobile home and then pres-
surized the lantern with approximately 30 pumps-per the in-
structions. Hammond carried the lantern into his home and lit
it, whereupon he alleged that an initial burst occurred and then
a second burst or explosion in which he was allegedly hit with
fuel from the lantern. Plaintiff suffered second and third degree
82 Id.
83 61 F. Supp. 2d 533 (S.D. Miss. 1999).
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burns and the total destruction of his mobile home as a result of
the accident.
Plaintiff proffered Alvin Kirk Rosenhan as his only expert. De-
fendant challenged this expert asserting his impressions and
opinions should be excluded because of relevancy and
reliability.
The plaintiff testified he was attempting to light the lantern
when a pop and then a bigger second pop occurred when the
lantern exploded. At some time during the lighting, he alleges
liquid fuel squirted from the lantern onto his body and was ig-
nited when the lantern exploded. Based on this testimony,
Rosenhan opined as to three possible causes of the alleged
squirting of fuel: (1) the screw-on cap; (2) the control knob or
dip tube mechanism through which the fuel came out of the
reservoir; and (3) the air pump that is used to pressurize the
fuel and make the lantern work. Rosenhan's testimony indicated
that it was his opinion that the air pump mechanism was the
most likely cause of the explosion.
The expert examined the burned lantern as well as a new lan-
tern. He determined the pump components appeared to be in-
tact and the aluminum knob on the end burned off. He
ultimately concluded that the squirt of fuel had to be related to
a defect in the air pump. However, he never specifically identi-
fied any defect in the lantern pump nor did he do any tests that
confirmed or recreated a defect in the pump.
Upon review, the court noted that the expert offered nothing
more than the plaintiff's testimony to support his opinions. In
fact, the court noted that Rosenhan never gave an opinion as to
what happened. The court determined that Rosenhan's prof-
fered testimony was merely a repeat of what the plaintiff had
indicated happened with the lantern and, as such, was not help-
ful to the jury. Additionally, the court noted that the testimony
was speculative in that no defect was identified. Further, the ex-
pert never considered the cause in terms of probability, only
possibilities, and he did not attempt to simulate or re-create the
incident with tests or accident reconstruction. Additionally, the
court noted that the plaintiff's proffered expert had never testi-
fied in a lantern case.
The court considered specifically the three options offered by
the proffered expert as to the cause. Dr. Rosenhan himself indi-
cated that the first thing he would do would be to check the air
pump. However, he admitted that he made no attempt to see
what was inside of the air pump itself. Furthermore, when ques-
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tioned about other alternatives, the doctor could not rule out
the possibility that a similar explosion would have occurred with-
out a cap when near a match or something flammable. Addi-
tionally, the court noted that the plaintiff or his expert had not
established any previous failures by Coleman lanterns in the
manner alleged to have occurred.
The expert assumed the testimony of the plaintiff to be true
without conducting adequate testing or re-creation of the acci-
dent. Also, he offered no feasible alternative design with regard
to the defect. Additionally, the plaintiff could not offer testi-
mony, nor could the expert establish the lantern was in substan-
tially the same condition as when it left the factory. Thus, the
expert offered nothing sufficient for a jury to determine "that it
was more probable then not that the carton immediately prior
to the accident was in substantially the same condition as when
it left the hands of [the seller]."84 In conclusion, the court de-
termined that the testimony offered was too speculative to be
admissible under rule 702, was not helpful to the jury, and had
no reliable basis, such that the testimony should be admitted.
Oglesby v. General Motors Corp.85 was a case that illustrated how
the basis for an expert opinion could not be assumed and how
the court will review the thoroughness of the expert's review of
the facts presented in the case. Oglesby was a products liability
action against General Motors Corporation alleging negligence,
breach of warranty, and strict liability. Plaintiff alleged that while
leaning into the engine compartment of a Chevrolet Silverado
pick-up truck to adjust a transmission cable, a radiator hose de-
tached, causing Oglesby serious burns. Plaintiff alleged specifi-
cally that the injuries were caused by a defective plastic hose
connector between the radiator and the radiator hose.
General Motors challenged the proffered expert testimony of
the plaintiff. The district court excluded the testimony and the
appellate court affirmed.
The facts in this case are of particular significance. In 1991,
Blaine Nielson purchased a used 1988 Chevrolet Silverado pick
up truck. Within the first years after purchasing the truck, Niel-
son had to overhaul the engine and rebuild the transmission. At
the same time, he removed the radiator, cleaned and flushed it,
and replaced the radiator hose. In 1995, when the truck had
approximately 156,000 miles, the engine began to experience
84 Id. at 541-42.
85 190 F.3d 244 (4th Cir. 1999).
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difficulties. It was at this time plaintiff Oglesby, a certified
mechanic, completely rebuilt the engine with his friend Nielson.
During this repair, they replaced the thermostat, removed and
cleaned the radiator, and replaced one of the hose clamps.
Within two weeks of this repair, the transmission began to expe-
rience more difficulties. Nielson and Oglesby decided to adjust
the transmission detent cable which causes a transmission to
change gears. To do this, Oglesby stepped on the driver's side
front bumper, leaned into the engine compartment and
reached down toward the engine's firewall where the cable was
located. According to Nielson, Oglesby was kneeling inside,
reaching to adjust the linkage. Apparently, as Oglesby leaned
down to adjust the cable, the radiator hose released and sprayed
hot coolant on him, severely burning his torso from the waste
down to his legs. Following the incident, Nielson reattached the
radiator hose and continued driving the truck. It was two
months later in September of 1995, when Oglesby's attorney in-
spected the radiator and discovered a broken piece of the
plastic connecting the radiator hose.
The plaintiff presented a former professor of medical engi-
neering at Clemson University, as a potential expert witness.
The expert had previously consulted in cases regarding mechan-
ical engineering and safety of various industrial products, but he
had no particular experience in evaluating automobiles or vari-
ous plastic automobile components.
In preparing his expert opinions, the expert looked at the
broken plastic connector and the piece that broke off, took
physical measurements of the connector, and photographed the
parts. This was the entirety of his investigation into the part or
its manufacturer. He found that the connector was not circular,
but flattened in shape. He noted a difference between the
dimensions as well. However, the expert did not know or learn
how the part was manufactured or from what material it was
manufactured. He did not know of any specifications prescribed
for the part, and did not perform any tests or calculations to
determine the strength of the part or the stresses to which it was
repeatedly subject. Nonetheless, the expert concluded the out-
of-roundness of the upper hose connector was apparently a
manufacturing defect. Two probable causes of the out-of-round-
ness were recognized. One was that the upper connector was
manufactured flat. According to the expert, this was most un-
likely considering the hold was designed to produce round cir-
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cular connectors. Further, this would have been spotted during
a routine on-line inspection.
He concluded it was more likely that a defect in the formula-
tion or handling of the thermosetting plastic caused time-de-
pendent internal stress to deform the connector from round to
oval [or flat], resulting in the loosening of the upper hose and
the scalding of plaintiff.
Contrary to this evidence, a General Motors' expert testified
that the part was not a thermosetting plastic, but rather a nylon
glass-filled composite that had thermoplastic characteristics, in-
cluding the ability to re-mold. To rebut this, plaintiffs expert
submitted a supplemental affidavit in which he acknowledged
that he incorrectly stated that the connector was made of such
plastic when it really was made of a glass thermostatic compos-
ite. He concluded that the error did not alter his opinion as to
the cause of the defect.
The court considered General Motors' motion to exclude the
expert testimony and determined that Oglesby failed to produce
competent evidence that the truck was in the same condition as
when it left the defendant's possession, because of the truck's
age, mileage, and prior repairs exceeding the reasonable limits
of establishing a fundamental element under South Carolina
product liability law. Additionally, the plaintiff did not introduce
evidence that General Motors knew of a potential product de-
fect involving this type of radiator.
Specifically, with regard to the proffered expert testimony,
the court noted that while the expert was a qualified mechanical
engineer who attempted to apply general engineering princi-
pals, his testimony was not sufficiently reliable as it did not prop-
erly draw on specialized knowledge, but rather unsupported
allegations. The court considered the fact that the expert ob-
served the inlet connector and noted it was flat rather than
round. The court specifically observed that he merely assumed
the manufacturer's mold was round and deduced that the con-
nector could become flat only during the time that it was in han-
dling. The court stated that he merely assumed this instead of
inspecting the mold or inspecting other like hoses having been
subject to these conditions.
In fact, the expert admitted he did not know of the type or
composition of the plastic, did not ask the manufacturer, did
not analyze the part, did not test it, and did not apply any calcu-
lations. He could not eliminate other causes for the plastic hav-
ing become flat or cracked, such as overheating, trauma to the
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inlet connector, or even stress applied by leaning on the connec-
tor with too much weight when the plastic was hot. He merely
assumed that the part could have gone flat after it left the manu-
facturer's mold, but asserted no factual basis for this conclusion.
The court determined that even applying generally known engi-
neering principals, the proffered expert failed to produce any
foundation and that the opinion lacked probative value because
of this lack of foundation. This left his opinion entirely specula-
tive and properly excluded. 6
In Weisgram v. Marley Co.,87 the plaintiff, Chad Weisgram,
brought suit individually and on behalf of his mother's, Bonnie
Weisgram, estate against Marley Co. for wrongful death. On De-
cember 30, 1993, the decedent was discovered in her home lying
face down on top of a large broken mirror in the upstairs bath-
room of the residence. Firefighters had been called to the home
when an off-duty firefighter noticed flames around the front en-
trance. Upon entering, the firefighters discovered the decedent.
They also found an open window in the upstairs bedroom,
which adjoined the bathroom where the body was found. The
cover of a smoke detector located on the ceiling in the upstairs
hall had been removed and was found on the carpeted floor
near the decedent's bedroom. A folding chair was on the floor
folded up near the detector cover, which was lying on the car-
pet. Apparently the smoke detector had been there before the
fire because no soot had accumulated underneath it on the
floor. A fifteen-year-old baseboard heater had been mounted on
a wall in the home before the fire. Although there was structural
fire damage around the entrance to the home, the remaining
portion of the house suffered damage from smoke, heat, and
water, but not fire.
It was later determined that the decedent died from smoke
inhalation at approximately 2:30 a.m. that day, prior to having
been discovered at 6:00 a.m. Carbon-monoxide poisoning was
the official cause of death. There was evidence that the dece-
86 This case is a perfect example of obtaining an expert who does not know the
facts of your case. The expert in this case did not observe similar conditions,
barely observed the parts at issue and did not observe their creation, their prac-
tice with simulation, or the conditions in which they were tested on a daily basis.
Furthermore, the expert did not go to the basic lengths of determining the com-
position of the alleged defective device in the automobile. These are all prelimi-
nary questions that should be answered by experts, not only for purposes of
admissibility, but for purposes of making their opinion particularly probative and
helpful to the jury.
87 169 F.3d 514 (8th Cir. 1999).
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dent's blood alcohol level was 0.15 and that she had taken a
drug generally prescribed to relieve pain and as a sleep aid. She
was last seen alive at 1:00 p.m. the previous day.
The jury awarded $500,000 to the plaintiff and estate. State
Farm, which insured the decedent's home and sued to recover
insurance benefits paid for the damage to the home, was
awarded $100,575.42. Defendant Marley filed a motion for judg-
ment as a matter of law and a motion for new trial. Both were
denied. On appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
defendant challenged the admission of certain expert testimony
presented by the plaintiff.
The Eighth Circuit first considered the plaintiffs burden of
proof in what was a strict product liability case.88 The court
noted that the plaintiffs were required to prove by preponder-
ance of the evidence that the baseboard heater was "defective in
design or manufacture; the defect rendered the product unrea-
sonably dangerous to the consumer; the defect existed when the
product left the manufacturer; and the defect was a proximate
cause of the [plaintiffs'] injuries."89 The court noted that it was
not entirely clear whether the plaintiffs were alleging the heater
had a design defect, a manufacturing defect, or no defect at all.
Thus, the court determined that the district court abused its dis-
cretion in allowing certain opinion testimony because the testi-
mony did not point to a defect or show that the heater was
unreasonably dangerous and proximately caused the fire.
At trial, plaintiffs introduced two witnesses. The first, Dan
Freeman, was the Fargo, North Dakota Fire Captain who arrived
with the first fire truck on the scene at the decedent's home. He
was also the firefighter who conducted the investigation into the
accident. Freeman testified he initially thought that careless
smoking might have started a fire in the sofa, but rejected that
theory because he saw no smoking materials in the home and
did not think the burn pattern in the sofa supported his suspi-
cion. Freeman's opinion was that the fire started in the defen-
dant's baseboard heater and radiating heat ignited the material
on the couch. Evidence indicated the sofa was six to eight feet
away from the heater and it was at least partially shielded from
any radiated heat. Over objection at trial, Freeman testified that
the fire started because of a malfunction in the heater.
- See id. at 517.
89 Id.
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The court began by noting that Freeman admitted he was not
an electrical expert and that he did not know what happened
with the heater. The court determined that while Freeman was
an expert as to cause and origin of fires, there was no question
he was not qualified to offer testimony as to the heater malfunc-
tion and thus should not have been permitted to testify on that
issue.
Furthermore, the court noted that Freeman's testimony was
"patent speculation"9 ° because he offered no evidence regard-
ing the location of other items, such as a throw rug, in the home
and their impact on the possible causes of the fire. For example,
although Freeman was qualified to testify that he thought the
fire originated in the area of the baseboard heater, he did not
support the theory. Freeman failed to substantiate his theory
that the throw rug somehow blocked the heater that ignited the
rug, transferring heat to the adhesive of the vinyl flooring,
which released deadly vapors that somehow ignited and acceler-
ated the fire. Although Freeman was otherwise qualified as a fire
inspector, the court found that this did not give him free reign
to speculate before the jury while relying on inferences that had
no support in the record.
Furthermore, Freeman was the person responsible for investi-
gating the cause of the fire, which required testing and analyz-
ing samples from the scene. Freeman, however, gathered only
samples of the burned rug from the area around the entrance-
way. These samples were tested for composition and to see
whether there was an accelerant present to support his theory.
The only other evidence-gathering Freeman did was to take
photographs and retrieve the burned baseboard heater. The
court stated that this showed Freeman only gathered evidence
that would support his early determination that the heater
caused the fire without investigating other possible causes.
Defendant Marley Company also challenged the reliability of
the second preferred expert, Ralph Dolence. Dolence was a
master electrician in Ohio. He testified as a fire investigator and
a technical forensic expert. He had previously consulted on
electrical fires, however, he denied being an expert electrician.
Dolence, like Freeman, believed the baseboard heater caused
the fire. But Dolence also failed to substantiate this theory prop-
erly. Most of his conclusions were drawn from the observations
Freeman made at the fire scene. He speculated that the small
90 Id. at 519.
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floor rug was pushed over the heater, trapping heat underneath,
and focused on the floor and linoleum releasing the deadly va-
pors from the adhesive on the floor, which lighted and caused
the fire. The court found the basis for this theory nonexistent.
Dolence did no testing to support his theory and further admit-
ted he knew of no tests that anyone had conducted to support a
similar theory of fire cause or origin. The court concluded this
was insufficient foundation on which to base opinion testimony.
Expert Dolence testified that because the thermostat and
other component parts of the heater were destroyed in the fire,
he was not able to test them. This opinion that the thermostat
suddenly and simultaneously did not function to shut the heater
off was unsupported. Dolence admitted he had no idea what
caused the thermostat or the component parts to fail. Further,
he admitted there were no design defects in the heater. He
could not create similar overheating episodes in an undamaged,
exemplar heater that had been retrieved after the fire from an-
other town house in the area.
Dolence contacted a metallurgist, Sandy Lazarowicz.
Lazarowicz was qualified as an expert as to the properties of
metal; however, he admitted was not a fire cause/origin expert.
Dolence contacted him to determine whether the heater was in
fact defective in some way. Lazarowicz examined the thermostat
contacts and the high limit control contacts from an exemplar
heater, as well as the same thermostat and internal component
in the decedent's heater. Because the thermostat contacts were
serrated, he believed the contacts were defectively designed.
The rough surfaces apparently cause arcing and material trans-
fer between the contacts. His theory was that the continual us-
age and build up of defects on the surface must have caused
them to weld. As a result, there was a closed circuit and the
heater could not shut off, thus causing the unit to overheat.
The court noted at the time Lazarowicz formed his opinions,
he was unaware of the heater wattage or amperage and was una-
ble to know the thermostat could have reached a high enough
temperature to melt the metal and form a weld before the fire
occurred. No tests were performed to determine whether it was
even possible for the contacts to become sufficiently hot for a
welding process to occur. Lazarowicz was unable to say that the
contacts actually welded notwithstanding his examination of
them under the microscope. It was only after close examination
of the contacts that he was he able to discern evidence of weld-
ing. The court of appeals determined the district court abused
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its discretion by permitting Lazarowicz's unsubstantiated
testimony.
In Bickley v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.,91 plaintiff brought suit in the
Northern District of Ohio for compensatory and punitive dam-
ages arising out of a train-truck collision at a Norfolk & Western
grade crossing. On December 9, 1993, Plaintiff Bickley was driv-
ing a semi tractor-trailer east on Portland Road in Erie County,
Ohio. Portland Road intersects a north-and-south railroad track
owned by the defendant. In his deposition testimony, Bickley
stated that as he approached the track he was traveling between
forty-five and fifty-five miles an hour, looked both north and
south before driving through the grade crossing, but neither
saw nor heard the defendant's train approaching. The train was
unable to stop in time to avoid hitting the plaintiffs truck. The
plaintiff suffered severe injuries. Plaintiff claimed the grade
crossing was "extra hazardous" because while exercising ordi-
nary care he was not able to see the train and could not avoid
the collision.
Defendant Norfolk & Western submitted a motion for sum-
mary judgment. Plaintiff, in rebuttal, proffered an expert wit-
ness, Dr. William Berg, a physical engineer and expert in the
field of railway and highway safety. Dr. Berg submitted an affida-
vit presenting numerous conditions that prevented plaintiff
Bickley from seeing the oncoming train so as to render this
crossing unusually hazardous. The affidavit included the follow-
ing conclusions: (1) the combination of a building structure
and vegetation, in addition to the angle at which the crossing
intersected the road, obstructed the plaintiffs view; (2) the min-
imum sight distance requirement could be met only if the train
speed did not exceed seven to nineteen miles per hour; how-
ever, the maximum train speed is forty miles per hour; (3) Port-
land Road has a "hump profile," which shows there is a slight
incline in the road before the tracks; and (4) Portland Road has
a high rate of truck traffic.
Dr. Berg also relied upon the Federal Department of Trans-
portation Crossing Accident Prediction Model. The model indi-
cated the expected vehicle/train accident rate at this crossing
was one accident every seven years, but that from 1985 until
1992 this crossing had an average of one accident every three
years. This accident rate was substantially above average and
91 (187 F.3d 634), 199 WL 427026 (6th Cir. June 15, 1999) (unpublished
opinion).
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placed this crossing among the most hazardous in Ohio and
throughout the defendant Norfolk Western system. Finally, Dr.
Berg stated that he examined the cause factors associated with
the accident, reviewed the accident reports, and the reconstruc-
tion of the time and space perimeters as reported by the plain-
tiff.92 In Dr. Berg's opinion, these facts rendered the crossing
unusually hazardous. He testified that safety features such as au-
tomatic gates and lights would have created merely a minimum
reasonable level of safety. No such safety precautions or features
were in use at the crossing. Defendant challenged the expert
testimony.
The district court determined that the proffered testimony
was inadmissible because it was unpersuasive, unsupported, ir-
relevant, and suspect. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing the
testimony for several reasons, including that: (1) although evi-
dence of prior accidents is admissible to show the dangerous
nature of a grade crossing, here, evidence of those accidents was
inadmissible because plaintiff failed to show a substantial simi-
larity between the Portland Road accident statistics and the acci-
dent at issue; (2) Dr. Berg's testimony as to the rate of speed was
unreliable and irrelevant because it dealt with the view from the
southwest quadrants, while the evidence indicated the relevant
view point was from the northwest quadrant; and (3) the admit-
ted photographs refuted plaintiff's assertion that a motorist who
looked and listened properly would have been unable to avoid
collision. For these reasons, the Sixth Circuit determined that
the district court properly excluded the expert testimony of Dr.
Berg. Finding no other evidence to support the plaintiff's claim,
the appellate court affirmed the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendant.
Plaintiff, in Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of North Am., Inc., 3
brought suit after being struck and injured by a rolling automo-
bile. Plaintiff commenced a diversity action alleging strict prod-
ucts liability, negligence, and breach of warranty against
Mercedes-Benz of North America and Daimler-Benz North
America Corporation. The facts are as follows:
On July 9, 1992, Bogosian drove her daughter's 1986 Merce-
des Benz "560 SEL" automobile home and pulled into the park-
92 Id. at *3. The plaintiff indicated he had about two seconds to perceive and
react to the train. Id.
(3 104 F.3d 472 (lst Cir. 1997).
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ing area adjacent to the driveway. According to her testimony,
Bogosian put the transmission gear selector level, which is lo-
cated on the console shift between the front driver and passen-
ger seats, in the park position. She did not set the parking
brake. The pavement upon which she parked was slightly sloped
toward the rear of the car. When she decided to check her mail
at the mailbox located near the street, the vehicle rolled back-
wards, struck her, knocked her down, ran over her ankle, and
caused her injuries. At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor
of Mercedes-Benz on the strict liability claim. Plaintiff appealed
contending the district court erred in granting judgment as a
matter of law to Mercedes-Benz on the negligence claim and in
excluding one of her proffered expert witnesses.
Plaintiff argued the district court improperly excluded the
proposed expert testimony of Joseph Davidson. Davidson held a
bachelors of science degree in industrial and vocational educa-
tion, and was certified to teach vocational automobile mechan-
ics. At the time of the trial, he was certified by the National
Institute for Automotive Service Excellence as a master automo-
bile technician for diagnosis and repair of various vehicles in-
cluding passenger cars. He had previously worked as an auto
mechanic from 1952 to 1967. Afterwards, he became a consult-
ant in forensic automotive mechanics, which was his full time
employment at the time of trial.
Davidson's testified about the false park detent theory. The
defendants challenged the testimony because the transmission
design was not within the expert's area of expertise, the method-
ology in examining the 560 SEL was unreliable, and the factual
foundation for the testimony was inadequate. The plaintiff was
unable to establish that the vehicle was in substantially the same
condition at the time it was tested as it was when the accident
occurred. The court set forth the standard of Daubert in Federal
Rule of Evidence 702, "when faced with a proffer of expert testi-
mony, the district court must determine whether the expert wit-
ness is qualified and has specialized knowledge that will 'assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine the
fact in issue.'94
The court determined that it was the responsibility of the trial
court to first determine whether or not the expert is qualified by
"knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education . . ."95 and
94 Id. at 476.
95 Id. (quoting FED. R. EvID. 702).
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second whether the proposed subject matter of the testimony
concerned "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge."96 Lastly, the appellate court acknowledged that the trial
court performs a "gatekeeping" function to determine whether
the testimony is ultimately helpful to the jury and whether it
rests on a reliable foundation based on the facts of the case. 7
Initially, the court considered Davidson's qualifications. The
court noted that Davidson did not have an engineering degree.
His formal education in engineering was limited to three semes-
ters of electrical engineering courses at Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity before he dropped out. Despite hands-on experience,
Davidson admitted that he had never professionally designed a
component for an automobile, although he had done so as an
expert in the courtroom. Additionally, he stated he had never
designed a transmission or a gearshift selector, and had no for-
mal training in manufacturing automobiles or their compo-
nents. With regard to this case, he had not seen design drawings
or specifications of the 560 SEL, but had reviewed service litera-
ture and cutaway drawings of the automobile. Further, although
Davidson had testified as an expert in 126 cases, only one of
them involved the false park detent theory. Moreover, his back-
ground showed a lack of any "significant expertise" with regard
to knowledge, skill, experience, or training in the areas of de-
sign or manufacture of automobiles and their components.9"
The court determined that " [w] hile not dispositive, the lack of a
mechanical engineering degree or other engineering expertise
certainly calls into question Davidson's ability to criticize the de-
sign of a transmission parking mechanism and its operation
under various circumstances."99 Consequently, the court deter-
mined that he was not qualified as an expert.
The court then considered the underlying methodology on
which Davidson based his opinion. Davidson's proposed testi-
mony was that he first identified the false park detent theory in
January of 1979. He would explain that this condition could oc-
cur when a gear selector lever is not placed completely in the
park groove, the position referred to as "latched park." In this
way, the gearshift would not lock into a certain position. The
position just outside of latched park could produce false park
96 Id.
97 104 F.3d at 476.
98 Id. at 477.
99 Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of North Am., Inc., 104 F.3d 472, 477 (1st Cir. 1997).
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detent, described as "a tactile sensation that the car is fully in
park gear. In this situation, the car is susceptible to rolling." 100
Davidson would have explained that a vehicle could suddenly
roll because the park mechanism was only slightly engaged and
not fully compressed. Davidson would have testified that false
park detent occurs when someone shifts quickly from drive to
park, but fails to fully engage the latched position.
In support of this testimony, Davidson pointed out that in Jan-
uary 1994, he questioned the plaintiff about the July 1992 events
leading up to the incident. He examined the parking area of
her home and measured the grade of the approximate parked
location. Davidson tested and experimented with the action of
the park lock in the vehicle's transmission. Davidson also tested
the gear shifter to confirm it was "in good adjustment." He in-
spected the right wheel and turned it until the park "pawl" in
the transmission locked in the park position. After he had done
so, he moved the gear selector out of park and turned the rear
wheel such that when he shifted back into park, the pawl would
hit the tip of the tooth on the gear. Essentially, he did this to test
for susceptibility for false park detent. Based on this testing, Da-
vidson was prepared to offer testimony that this mechanism
caused false park detent.
Citing the district court's concerns with this testimony, the
court of appeals agreed with the district court's finding that Da-
vidson was not qualified because there was no evidence in the
record that Davidson's test was a known technique. He did not
produce a journal, paper, or anything to show that this tech-
nique was tested or approved.
Plaintiff, at this stage of the proceedings, argued that the dis-
trict court committed reversible error because it characterized
the subject matter of Davidson's testimony as "scientific" instead
of "technical" so as to render Daubert analysis inapplicable. The
appellate court assumed, for argument's sake, that this case did
not involve science or scientific testimony. But it determined the
outcome would be the same because the purpose of the judge's
role in determining admissibility of expert testimony is to en-
sure that the testimony is reliable and relevant to the task at
hand. Thus, even if the court erred in characterizing the testi-
mony as scientific, the analysis was effective nonetheless. 1 '
100 Id. at 478.
101 Id. at 479.
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In addition, the court noted that the tests run by Davidson did
not reproduce conditions similar to those that existed in the ac-
cident. For example, he viewed the automobile at a dealership
rather than on the driveway or on a similar grade. Additionally,
Davidson assumed that the false park detent occurred by rapidly
shifting the gear lever from drive to park. However, no evidence
was introduced that this was so. Furthermore, plaintiff testified
repeatedly that she looked at the console shift before exiting the
vehicle and saw the gearshift in park. The fact that her testi-
mony conflicted with the factual basis upon which the expert
based his opinion was sufficient grounds to render the opinion
unreliable, contradictory, and probably not helpful to the jury
for accessing what actually happened.
Finally, the court considered defendant's argument that
plaintiffs expert failed to show that the condition of the 560
SEL at the time of the expert's exam was substantially similar to
that at the time of the accident. Again, the car was viewed in an
auto dealership, not outside on a similar type of grade or drive-
way so as to reproduce the conditions. There was no evidence
produced that the transmission was in the same condition at the
time the expert viewed the car as at the time of the accident. 10 2
The court determined that the proffered testimony was neither
sufficient nor entirely relevant. Ultimately, the court concluded
that the district court correctly exercised its discretion to ex-
clude the testimony of Davidson.
Libas, Ltd. v. United States'0 3 is a rare case in which the Federal
Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by giving
consideration to the weight rather than merely the admissibility
of the proffered expert testimony.
Plaintiff Libas imported fabric from India through a port in
Los Angeles. In 1994, it imported thirty-two bales of rolled cot-
ton fabric previously certified by the Indian government as
hand-loomed and entered the fabric as a "certified hand-
loomed product" under subheading 5208.42.1000, Harmonized
Tariff Schedule of the United States. In September 1994, U.S.
Customs demanded redelivery of the fabric and subjected it to a
new test to determine whether the fabric had been power-
loomed or hand-loomed. Ultimately, the U.S. Customs classified
102 A prima facie showing of substantial identity of a product's condition at the
time of an accident versus the time of an inspection is one of the key considera-
tions in such cases. See Kukuruza v. Gen. Elec. Co., 510 F.2d 1208, 1212 (1st Cir.
1975).
103 193 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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the fabric as power-loomed. As such, power loomed fabrics were
subject to the Harmonized Tariff Schedules of the United
States.,
Underneath the umbrella of this specialized international
area of law, the court undertook a typical Daubert analysis with
regard to the excluded expert testimony. For purposes of deter-
mining whether the U.S. Customs classification as power-
loomed was correct, Libas sought to introduce expert testimony
that skilled hand weavers could produce results similar to ma-
chine weaving and that washing of the fabric would reduce the
discrepancy between the results of the two production
processes. This raised questions about whether the U.S. Customs
test would accurately distinguish between power-loomed and
hand-loomed fabric. The Federal Circuit noted at this point that
the proffered testimony challenged the reliability of the customs
procedures and that the district court should have examined the
customs test with either a Daubert-style analysis or some other
manner of examination to determine reliability. The district
court determined that, because plaintiffs witnesses testified that
the customs tests were widely accepted in the industry and had
been used for many years so as to be "reasonably calculated to
determine whether fabric is loomed by machine or by hand,"
the customs experts need not be evaluated pursuant to a
Daubert-type analysis.'04
Plaintiffs main contention was that the trial court erred by
not evaluating the proffered customs witnesses under Daubert.
Despite that testimony from plaintiffs witnesses showed that the
customs tests were widely known, accepted, and had been used
for years, the appellate court stated this did not render them
automatically admissible, inasmuch as "widespread acceptance"
was only one factor in the assessment of reliability.' °5 The court
noted upon review that it was significant that the U.S. Customs
tests failed to satisfy any of the Daubert factors except general
acceptance and offered no other indicia of reliability. A Daubert
or other similar type of inquiry should have been made with re-
gard to the customs evidence. The court remanded the case for
such a determination.
Clark v. Takata Corp.,10 6 the plaintiff, while traveling in his
1991 Honda Accord on a highway in Kentucky, was struck from
104 Id. at 1367.
105 Id. at 1368 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594).
106 192 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 1999).
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behind by a party driving a pickup truck. The collision caused
plaintiff's vehicle to veer off the road and roll down an embank-
ment. Plaintiff Clark suffered spinal cord injuries and subse-
quently sued Takata Corp., American Honda Motor Co., Honda
Motor Co., Honda of American Manufacturing, Inc., and
Honda R & D Co. Plaintiff alleged that his seat belt was defective
because it came unlatched during the rollover allowing his head
to strike the roof and causing his injuries. At trial, the district
court judge excluded plaintiffs experts. Defendants filed a mo-
tion for summary judgment, which the district court granted.
Clark appealed, assigning the trial judge's exclusion of prof-
fered expert testimony as error.
Plaintiff obtained Dr. James Lafferty, P.E., Ph.D., to serve as
an expert witness. Lafferty submitted an expert report, that con-
cluded but for Mr. Clark's lap belt unlatching, he would have
been restrained from hitting the roof of the Honda and would
have suffered no serious injuries. Lafferty testified similarly in a
subsequent deposition, yet gave no indication about how he ar-
rived at this conclusion.
In the one-and-one-half page report, Dr. Lafferty stated that
he based this opinion on his review of the pertinent medical
records, relying on the fact that the plaintiff suffered a fracture
dislocation of vertebrae C6 and C7 of his spinal column. He
then estimated the amount of force necessary to cause the plain-
tiffs injuries. He concluded the necessary force was 1,000
pounds. Thus, the injury occurred when the plaintiff's head hit
the roof while the car was rolling over. In his report, Lafferty
indicated that he took plaintiffs measurements and determined
his seated height was approximately 32 inches. He indicated the
distance from the bottom of the seat cushion to the roof of the
Honda was 36 inches, so that plaintiff had 4 inches of clearance
between his head and the roof of the car. From this, Lafferty
opined that a lap belt would have prevented his neck injury.
The court held Lafferty's opinion was speculation because it
was based on no substantive facts. Lafferty did not consider the
plaintiffs height or weight in drawing these conclusions. Laf-
ferty made no other measurements. He did not know how far
the seat was reclined or the degree or extent to which the roof
was crushed. Facing a Motion for Summary Judgment, Lafferty
filed and affidavit in which he stated:
[i]n order to clarify my opinion so that there can be no doubt
about my opinion, I would like to re-state my professional opin-
ion .... [B] ased on my education, research, and experience in
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the fields of Biomechanics and Mechanical Engineering it is my
professional opinion that had [Clark's] lap belt remained fast-
ened, Clayton Clark would not have suffered serious injury.1"7
Lafferty further mentioned that there was a relative lack of
blood on the lap belt in comparison to the blood on the shoul-
der harness and seat. This indicated that the lap belt was proba-
bly not buckled during and after the accident.
Citing the Daubert rule and the function of the trial court to
ensure that only reliable and relevant evidence makes it to the
jury, the appellate court determined that the proffered testi-
mony essentially consisted of two opinions. First, the lap belt un-
buckled during the rolling over of the car; and second, a
properly functioning lap belt would have prevented plaintiffs
injuries. When determining whether the expert conclusions
were helpful to the jury, the court noted that Lafferty assumed
as true the fact that Clark needed to prove in order to recover,
namely, that the lap belt, though previously secure, became un-
latched during the accident.
The court indicated that a liability expert is only helpful to
the jury if he is able to establish an element of the claim. This
could be done through visual inspection, independent research,
testing and knowledge. Lafferty's testimony, however, indicated
he had not proven the allegation, but rather assumed it to be
true. The court concluded subjective belief or unsupported
speculation does not assist the jury in determining whether the
product failed.
With regard to Lafferty's second opinion that had the lap belt
been latched the plaintiff would have been restrained from strik-
ing the ceiling of the car, the opinion was again based solely on
assumption without any testing or research material to support
this theory. As the appellate court noted, Lafferty failed to deter-
mine, or even consider, the speed at which the car was driving,
the intensity of forces to which the car and the plaintiff were
subjected, or the strength or flex of the car and lap belt. Be-
cause none of these factors were addressed, the opinion offered
by Lafferty was otherwise unsupported.
Lafferty's opinion could be contrasted with Harry Smith, the
defendant's expert. Mr. Smith conducted three driver and ex-
emplar tests involving two Honda Accords similar to the acci-
dent vehicle. In two of the tests, the vehicles were mounted and
rotated to determine how a driver of Clark's size and weight
107 See id. at 756 (alterations in original).
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would have moved during a similar type of rollover action. The
defendant's expert also relied on published studies showing ki-
netics of the human body in both restrained and unrestrained
safety belts. Based on these facts and research, Smith concluded
that without the seatbelt, the plaintiff would have been ejected
from the car, not merely thrown against its ceiling.
Absent a showing that Lafferty considered the facts of the
case, specifically the height of the plaintiff, the angle at which
he sat, the height of the seat, the level of incline, the velocity of
the car, the precise movement of the vehicle, or any simulations
thereof, Lafferty's expert testimony was unfounded. Moreover,
it merely assumed the fact it was expected to prove. For this rea-
son, the appellate court found the district court correctly ex-
cluded plaintiff's expert.
IV. THE RESULTS
Unfortunately, Kumho has not clarified the standard for ad-
missibility, eliminated junk science, or streamlined the litigation
process. The most significant impact has been on the amount of
preparation and the timing of preparation litigators must under-
take. Clearly, as practitioners, we must identify the issues in the
case early in the discovery process in order to both choose quali-
fied experts and gather information the experts need to render
opinions that withstand the Daubert challenge. As such, a few
practice pointers seem obvious.
Choose an expert well qualified in the particular field. Spe-
cialized experts are in higher demand in light of challenges
based on the background education and training threshold.
The general-purpose expert in any field-medical, engineering,
mechanics-is significantly disadvantaged when challenged by
an opponent with an expert highly specialized in a particular
aspect of her field.
Consult with your experts early and often. Experts must now
accept greater responsibility throughout the discovery process.
The information provided the expert by the attorney is often
insufficient or ineffective as a basis for testimony. Experts must
be prepared to inform the attorney of information needed; tests
that must be performed; and, most significantly, attend at depo-
sition if possible. Additionally, experts must anticipate the basis
of challenges of the work performed, inform counsel of the
weakness, and prepare a cure for the weakness. These precau-
tions can only be accomplished through consistent
communication.
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Become an expert yourself. An advocate cannot effectively
challenge an expert witness without adequate knowledge, nor
can the unenlightened recognize weaknesses in her own expert.
Focus your deposition on the reasoning and methodology
supporting the opinions. Rule 26 disclosures express the opin-
ions of experts; rarely do opinions change in deposition. Narrow
your focus to the reasoning suppporting the opinions. Specifi-
cally, challenge each opinion at its most basic scientific princi-
ples or conversely prepare for such a challenge. The expert
must expect to support each proposition with both the factual
basis as established in the record and the pure science that leads
to the applied science of her field.
Do not ignore the Daubert factors. Unfortunately, there is still
room for the unenlightened judge to "fit the square peg into
the round hole." This fact, coupled with the abuse of discretion
standard of review, make dismissal of these factors extremely
treacherous ground. Even with technical experts, we should
look to the trade journals and beyond for supporting documen-
tation, testing, and acceptance in the community.
V. CONCLUSION
In light of these concentrated efforts that must now go into
the preparation of experts and the significantly higher rate of
expert challenges, we must all be prepared for increases in the
cost of litigation. We can expect higher expert fees, higher dis-
covery costs, and an increase in motion practice. As such, one
might question whether this evidentiary standard is better than
the Frye 0 8 test.
108 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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